Syria

KEY ISSUES

• Statelessness is a significant problem in Syria, due in particular to historic mass denationalisation, gender discrimination in the nationality law and intergenerational statelessness of Palestinians residing in the country.
• In 1962, a one-day census in Al-Hasakah province, caused large-scale statelessness, mainly among Kurds. While some gained citizenship through a Decree passed in 2011, it is estimated that over 150,000 people remain without citizenship.
• Syrian nationality law discriminates on the grounds of gender (nationality is conferred only from father to child) and although it contains safeguards against childhood statelessness, these are not consistently implemented. 
• The Syrian revolution in 2011 and the subsequent conflict led to a rise in statelessness. The involvement of foreign combatants and marriages to individuals affiliated with radical groups resulted in numerous births without clear nationality, leaving many children stateless. 
• Syria had a strong civil registration system prior to the conflict, yet some challenges still occur among internally displaced persons (IDPs) in non-government-controlled areas which can leave children unable to establish their nationality.
• Syria is not party to the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons or the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, and has no statelessness determination or protection system in place.

STATELESSNESS IN SYRIA

The Syrian Arab Republic (Syria) has a sizeable stateless population, due to several root causes. These include historic mass denationalisation of the Kurdish community, gender discrimination in the nationality law and intergenerational statelessness of Palestinians in Syria. The risk of new cases of statelessness arising, as well as the vulnerability of stateless individuals, has considerably heightened since the onset of the civil conflict in 2011, because of the changing socio-political context, large-scale displacement and the impact on access to civil registration documents. Children born in situations of displacement – within or outside Syria – as well as children born in areas that were controlled by non-state actors, face particular risks of statelessness. The influx of so-called “foreign fighters” into Syria further added to the complexity of nationality and statelessness issues in the country. At the same time, some stateless Kurds have been able to access nationality in Syria during this period as a result of a Decree that was introduced in 2011.

As of 2022, the UNHCR figure for the number of stateless people in Syria is 160,000. However, this figure is likely to be outdated, given that it remains unchanged since 2013 and does not account for changes that have occurred since 2011 (naturalisations, for which no official data is available, but also newly emerging cases of statelessness). The data also does not account for the Palestinian stateless population in Syria. In 2021, GlobalCit reported that alongside the estimated three hundred thousand Kurds deprived of citizenship as a result of the 1962 census, a population of just under half a million Palestinian refugees from Syria who face intergenerational statelessness and are excluded from applying for Syrian nationality under the country’s laws. 

Lack of nationality has a significant knock-on impact on access to rights and services in Syria. Syria is not a party to either of the UN statelessness conventions and there is no statelessness determination or protection system in place in the country. Education remains a pressing concern for many (formerly) stateless people of Syria, both in terms of compensating for missed opportunities, and obtaining accreditation for studies undertaken. Moreover, even stateless Kurds who have been able to naturalise face difficulties in transferring land and property into their names and acquiring formal paperwork to this effect. Palestinian refugees fall under the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and can be divided into two groups: those who arrived up to 1956 (and their descendants) and those who came after 1956. The first group is registered with the Syrian General Authority for Palestinian and Arab Refugees (GAPAR) and the second group is not. Those registered with GAPAR enjoy almost the same rights as Syrian citizens. However, they cannot vote in elections or stand for election and have limited property ownership rights. Palestinians not registered with GAPAR are regarded by the Syrian authorities as foreigners residing in Syria. 

THE RIGHT TO NATIONALITY IN SYRIA

Syrian citizens are officially defined as “Syrian Arab citizens”, in the Syrian Constitution (article 48), which provides that citizenship is to be regulated by legislation. The constitution does not, therefore, set the conditions for acquiring or losing nationality, but it does provide a framing of citizenship based on the identity of Syria as an “Arab” Republic. The rules for acquisition and loss of nationality are set out in the Syrian Nationality Law, found in the Legislative Decree №276, which has remained unchanged since 1969.

In Syria, conferral of nationality discriminates by gender, as the law follows paternal jus sanguinis, where nationality is transferred from father to child. Syria does not generally provide for birthright citizenship or jus soli. There are only some exceptions whereby nationality can be acquired in the absence of a paternal link, such as for foundlings (Article 3C) and for children who are born in Syria to an unknown father and a Syrian Arab mother (Article 3B). The law also provides for access to nationality for any child born in Syria who was not, at the time of their birth, entitled to acquire a foreign nationality by virtue of their parentage – i.e. who would otherwise be stateless (Article 3D). However, these safeguards are not always implemented. In practice, intergenerational statelessness is a widespread challenge in the country, and the social repercussions of registering a child who is born out of wedlock can obstruct the application of special rules that would enable a Syrian mother to confer nationality. Conferral of nationality by Syrian mothers in situations where the legal relationship to their father has not been established is also restricted to children born inside Syria and does not apply to the children born in refugee-hosting countries to Syrian women who have been forced to flee the conflict.

In 2008, the Syrian Women’s League estimated that there were approximately 100,000 Syrian women married to non-nationals, mostly from other Arab states, and more specifically Egyptians, Iraqis and Palestinians. Many stateless male spouses of female nationals are unable to access citizenship. The Nationality Act regulates how a man can transfer nationality to his non-Syrian wife but does not provide for similar facilitated acquisition of nationality for the male spouse of a female citizen. There is also no facilitated naturalisation for stateless people. 

The Syrian Nationality Law includes seven provisions that allow the revocation of nationality. Some of these paragraphs are vaguely worded and leave considerable room for interpretation by the state authorities, potentially leading to arbitrary nationality deprivation. For example, nationality can be deprived from a person who engaged in any activity for a country which is in a state of war with Syria or based on Syrian security and safety concerns. Documented instances from the 1960s and 1970s show that political dissidents opposing the ruling Baath party have also been subject to arbitrary nationality removal through presidential decrees. An estimated 27,000 people were denationalised in this period and may have been rendered stateless. There is another clause defining the revocation of citizenship in case a person has left the country indefinitely for the purpose of settling in a non-Arab country, if he has been away for more than three years and has been notified to return but has failed to respond or has given unconvincing reasons within three months of receiving the notification. The extent to which this clause is implemented is not known. 

STATELESSNESS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CONFLICT IN SYRIA

Since 2011, the Syrian conflict and resultant large-scale displacement, combined with pre-existing factors such as Syria’s gender discriminatory laws, has dramatically increased the risk of statelessness – especially amongst children born to Syrian women in both state and non-state controlled areas inside the country, as well as outside the country for those who have fled as refugees. Difficulties accessing civil registration and the arrival of foreign fighters into the country from 2012 onwards created additional complications, including in relation to unregistered and illegal marriages.

Refugees from Syria with a heightened risk of becoming stateless include: children whose birth in the host State is not registered by the statutory deadline; children born within female-headed households; children born within child marriages; undocumented refugees and refugees not registered with UNHCR. Some refugees fled Syria already stateless – including Palestinians and Kurds – and may subsequently encounter heightened protection risks. Some Palestinian Refugees from Syria (PRS) faced difficulties registering for assistance with either UNRWA or UNHCR. There were also reports that statelessness may be a factor which complicates access to durable solutions for refugees from Syria, including limiting access to resettlement programmes. Many Syrian refugees face strong pressure to return to their home country, especially in major host states like Lebanon and Turkey. This situation puts Syrians at risk of being part of a settlement process that categorizes citizens as either loyal or disloyal returnees. Even if this does not lead to a formal revocation of citizenship, which is possible under Syrian law, it may have implications for their enjoyment of rights as citizens. 

Before the 2011 revolution, Syria had developed a strong system of birth registration and was achieving nearly 100% coverage. However, in 2018, it was reported that many civil registries had been “partially or totally destroyed”. For those residing in areas that are, or were for some time, outside of the control of the Syrian Government, there are heightened challenges to accessing civil registration. Documents issued by non-state actors may not be recognised, may not be genuine, or may contain different formatting and stamps. In 2022, UNHCR stated that protection issues relating to civil documentation remained significant, with loss of civil documentation reported in 76% of assessed communities, up from 61% in 2021. The inability of children who are living in these non-state controlled areas to register their births is a substantial challenge to their right to registration and right to nationality.

Under Syrian law, the mother and father must have a registered marriage in order to register the birth of their child, regardless of whether the birth occurs inside or outside Syria. However, marriages of Syrian citizens to non-Arab foreigners require prior approval from the Syrian Minister of Interior in order to be registered in the civil registry. This created problems following the influx of foreign fighters into Syria from 2012 onwards. Instances of Syrian women marrying individuals affiliated with radical groups led to numerous births without clear nationality. Mothers face challenges such as a lack of proof of the father’s identity or whereabouts, or of the marriage, when trying to register their children. Syrian women cannot pass on their own nationality, and even where their children are legally entitled to the nationality of their foreign father, many of these fathers have died or disappeared, sometimes without their wives knowing their legal names, making it difficult for mothers to obtain proper documentation for their children. The situation is no better for women associated with the Syrian regime, due to the regime’s recruitment of foreign mercenaries – including from Iraqi, Iranian, Lebanese, and Afghan militias – resulting in illegal marriages and births where again access to nationality is challenging. According to 2023 statistics by the Documentation and Monitoring Department, as many as 7,000 stateless children are present in camps in northeast Syria. The Social Affairs Board affiliated with the Hayat Tahrir al-Shamin Idlib estimated that more than 5,000 stateless children are present in its regions. There have also been several cases of citizenship stripping of foreign fighters who came to Syria from Western countries by their own governments, as a counter-terrorism measure. Denmark, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom are among those states, stranding their former nationals in Syria following their denationalisation and the refusal to repatriate.

[Last updated January 2024]

Cover photo by Hosein Charbaghi